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The Comeback of the Swiss Watch Industry on the World Market: 
A Business History of the Swatch Group (1983-2010)* 
Pierre-Yves DONZÉ† 
 
Abstract 
The objective of this paper is to contribute to a better understanding of the comeback of the 
Swiss watch industry on the world market since the end of the 1980s. It focuses on the Swatch 
Group (SG), currently the world’s biggest watch company. 
In 1983, the merger of the largest watch group (SSIH) and of the trust controlling the 
production of parts and movements of watches (ASUAG) into SG was the main measure 
taken to overcome the Japanese competition. Managed since 1986 by Nicolas G. Hayek 
(1928-2010), SG experienced a high growth and recovered its competitiveness on the world 
market, becoming a driving force for the entire Swiss watch industry. This success is 
traditionally explained by the firm itself and by scholars as the result of the launch of a new 
product (Swatch, a cheap plastic quartz watch first marketed in 1983) and the persistence of 
an old technical culture in Switzerland which enabled this rebirth. 
This paper, based on SG annual reports, focuses on the strategy adopted by SG since 1983. It 
shows that, rather than product innovation (Swatch), it was the rationalization and 
globalization of the production system (concentration of strategic parts’ production in 
Switzerland; transfer of production facilities in Asia), together with a new marketing strategy 
(brand segmentation, distribution and retailing facilities, communication, etc.) which were the 
two main sources of the comeback of the Swiss watch industry on the world market. While 
Japanese still attach great attention to product innovation, SG largely established its 
competitiveness on non-technological innovation. 
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Introduction 
This paper tackles the comeback of the Swiss watch industry on the world market after the 
1975-1985 crisis. The analysis focuses on the Swatch Group (SG), the main Swiss watch 
company since its foundation in 1983 and the current world leader in this branch, with the 
objective of shedding light on the strategic choices made by the firm and their 
implementation. 
The Swiss watch industry was considered as virtually dead at the beginning of the 1980s, not 
having been able to repel the worldwide expansion of its Japanese rival. Thanks to the mass 
production of high-quality mechanical watches followed by quartz watches, the Japanese 
watch industry undertook in the second half of the 1960s a growth strategy aimed at putting 
an end to Swiss domination of the world market.1 The tremendous development of Japanese 
watch companies in the 1970s, whose production value skyrocketed from USD 350 million in 
1970 to 2.0 billion in 1980, allowed the country to overtake Switzerland in 1981-1985. 
During this five-year period, the average value of Japanese watch production amounted to 
USD 1.96 billion, as compared with USD 1.69 billion for Swiss watch exports.2 These 
statistics do not include the Swiss domestic market, but it is unlikely that it had a decisive 
influence due to its very small size. Moreover, Japanese watch exports amounted to an 
average of USD 1,741 million in 1981-1985, that is, a higher value than Switzerland, a 
difference which clearly reflects how Swiss watchmakers had become less competitive on the 
world market.3 
Japanese competition triggered a major crisis in Switzerland, characterized by a drop and 
stagnation in exports as well as a steep decline in employment (from 89,000 in 1970 to 33,000 
in 1985).4 Yet at the end of the 1980s, both countries moved into entirely different phases, 
marked by a huge growth of Swiss exports (USD 4.9 billion in 1990; 6.1 billion in 2000; 11.5 
billion in 2009) on the one hand, and a stagnation then a drop in Japanese exports (USD 2.8 
billion USD in 1990; 1.5 billion in 2000; 0.6 billion in 2009).  
In Japan, since the 1990s, in the context of the decline of the watch industry, both the watch 
companies and the scholars have given high priority to product innovation in order to get out 
of the crisis and to become competitive once again with the Swiss watch industry. This 
obsession with product innovation has led firms to launch many new products (solar watch 
1995; spring drive watch 1999; radio-controlled watch 2005), but has had very little impact in 
terms of growth.5 In the meanwhile, management scholars also continue to attach great 
                                                 
1
 Donzé 2011a. 
2
 Statistique annuelle du commerce extérieur de la Suisse, Berne: Federal Customs Department, various years ; 
Kikai tokei nenpo, Tokyo : MITI, various years; 
3
 Nihon gaikoku boeki tokei, Tokyo: Ministry of Finance, various years. 
4
 Convention 2008, p. 13. For the crisis, see Donzé 2011b. 
5
 Donzé 2010. 
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importance to technological innovation, emphasizing product diversification or product 
modularization as ways to recover competitiveness.6 
While the Japanese have stuck to technological innovation, Swiss scholars have given more 
weight to cultural issues and marketing strategy in explaining the shifts that have occurred in 
this industry since the 1990s. Two main approaches can be distinguished. The first and 
predominate one is an explanation based on the industrial district theory.7 The use of some 
key elements of Marshall’s district (industrial atmosphere, inter-firm competition-cooperation 
relations, etc.) made it possible to interpret the rebirth of the Swiss watch industry as resulting 
from a technical culture situated in a specific territory, which enabled the repositioning of the 
industry at the high end and the manufacture of quality products using traditional know-how. 
However, this kind of approaches cause problem, because they propose a model which is 
based on a disputable interpretation of industrial district and on an analysis which does not 
rely enough on documentary sources, on the one hand, and because they do not insert the 
Swiss watch industry in a global context, on the other hand. 
The second approach interprets the revival of the Swiss watch industry as the consequence of 
a new marketing strategy aimed at a repositioning towards Japanese and Chinese competitors. 
Glasmeier briefly showed that the readaptation of the Swiss production system to global 
competition in the 1980s – what she called a “reorganization à la Japanese”8 – was the source 
of the restored competitiveness of Swiss watchmakers. As for the works of Crevoisier and his 
team, they highlighted not only the transformation of the production system but also the 
decisive importance of new marketing strategies.9 According to Jeannerat and Crevoisier, the 
basis for the success of the Swiss watch industry is precisely a “non-technological 
innovation.”10 However, work dealing with the regional economy generally focuses on the 
period after 2000 and fails to situate this strategy as part of a historical process. 
This contribution forms part of the second kind of approaches described above. It is aimed at 
furthering understanding of the implementation of the new marketing strategy adopted by the 
Swiss watch industry in the 1990s and, notably, at highlighting links with the production 
system. The approach adopted here is that of business history, with a special focus on the 
Swatch Group (SG). However, in view of this company’s unique position within the Swiss 
watch industry, as the biggest firm (26.6% of all employment in this sector in Switzerland in 
1990; 28.9% in 2000)11, on the one hand, and as a quasi-monopolistic producer and supplier 
of parts and movements for the entire industry, on the other hand, understanding its 
development sheds light on the evolution of the industry as a whole. 
                                                 
6
 Shintaku 1994, Hara 2003, Nakamoto 2003, Sakakibara and Matsumoto 2005, Kimura 2009. 
7
 Fragomichelakis 1994, Landes 2000, Pasquier 2008a, Pasquier 2008b.  
8
 Glasmeier 2000, p. 247. 
9
 Crevoisier 1993. 
10
 Jeannerat and Crevoisier 2011. 
11
 Own calculations on the basis of Convention 2008, p. 13, and SG annual reports. 
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1. The creation of SG and the “legend of the Swatch” 
At the beginning of the 1980s, the main measure adopted to pull out of the recession was the 
merger of the two biggest Swiss watch groups, namely ASUAG and SSIH (1983). With gross 
sales amounting respectively to CHF 1.3 billion and CHF 815 million in 1979, they 
outstripped other watchmakers, third place being commonly occupied by the Société des 
Garde-Temps SA and Rolex, whose gross sales at the time were evaluated at CHF 190 
million.12 What is more, in 1979 ASUAG and SSIH employed about half of the workforce in 
the Swiss watch industry.13 However, this clout must be seen in perspective, as it was 
primarily due to the crisis which impacted other companies. In reality, ASUAG and SSIH 
faced huge industrial and financial difficulties, and their survival owed much to the support of 
the major banks. 
ASUAG had difficulties due to the fast-paced growth and diversification of previous decades. 
Whereas this company had initially been founded in 1931 as a trust controlling the production 
of movements and parts for nearly all the industry and benefited from the support of the 
federal State, the liberalization of the 1960s called this traditional role into question. 
Consequently, the firm attempted in 1971 to diversify into the production of complete watches 
by setting up the group General Watch Co. (GWC), which included notably the companies 
Longines and Rado. This strategy had a deep impact on the company’s finances and 
management. Between 1970 and 1974, ASUAG assets shot up from CHF 54.5 million to CHF 
234.1 million. Of course, gross sales were also growing steadily during this period, rising 
from CHF 760 million in 1970 to a peak of CHF 1.4 billion in 1974. However, ASUAG 
depended increasingly on outside capital, which made it possible to found GWC. It amounted 
to 28.3% of assets in 1974 as against 23.7% in 1970. As a result, when the Swiss watch 
industry went into a tailspin, ASUAG’s gross sales plummeted to less than CHF 1.2 billion 
per year in 1975-1978 and its dependency on bank capital deepened.14 
SSIH was also hit by the crisis after 1974. This group of complete watch-makers, including 
especially Omega and Tissot, diversified extensively in the 1960s and the early 1970s, 
especially into cheap mechanical watches (Economic Swiss Time Co.), which were not 
competitive on the world market. Between 1974 and 1982, SSIH collapsed. The volume of 
sales plummeted from 12.4 million to 1.9 million watches, while gross sales sank from CHF 
733 million to CHF 537 million. As for employees, they numbered 7,300 in 1974 but only 
3,400 in 1982.15 Banks kept the company going, granting credits and becoming involved in 
management. A restructuring committee, led by the Union Bank of Switzerland (UBS), the 
                                                 
12
 JETRO 1982. 
13
 JETRO 1982. 
14
 ASUAG annual reports, 1970-1979. 
15
 Fallet 2003, p. 185. 
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Swiss Bank Corporation (SBC) and Credit Suisse (CS), was set up in 1980. The following 
year, a former director of UBS, Peter Gross, was appointed President of the Board of 
Directors. Between 1981 and 1983, banks injected more than CHF 900 million into these two 
watch groups and tried to withdraw as soon as they could.16  
 
1.1 The creation of SG and corporate governance in 1983-1986 
To pull off this reorganization, banks turned to the consultant Nicolas G. Hayek. Born at 
Beirut in 1928 and trained at the University of Lyon (France), Hayek had founded in 1963 a 
consulting firm in Zurich, Hayek Engineering, working for several European industrial 
companies.17 In the reports he wrote for banks in 1982, he proposed as the main measure 
merging ASUAG and SSIH into a single holding company, the Société suisse de 
microélectronique et d’horlogerie SA (SMH). This was done in 1983, giving birth to the 
world largest watch group, which changed its name to Swatch Group in 1998 (hereafter SG). 
The years 1983-1986 were a transition period when the merger was implemented. The whole 
structure of SG was indeed very unwieldy, as ASUAG and SSIH were both organized as 
holding companies possessing several groups of enterprises – sometimes with their own 
subsidiaries. In 1983, the various companies were grouped together into three sub-holdings, 
depending on their type of activity (complete watches; movements and parts; other), and 
initially characterized by rationalization. This policy was directed by a four-member 
Executive Management Board.18 Chaired by Pierre Arnold, CEO of the Migros chain store 
and a member of several Boards of Directors (CFF, Swissair), it also included three division 
managers from both merged companies (Ernest Thomke for watch production, Andor Helti 
for high-tech and Carl M. Meyer for finances). This board worked under the supervision of 
Nicolas G. Hayek, who was engaged until 1986 as a special adviser to the Board of Directors, 
and went on to become the real seat of power within SG. 
As for the Board of Directors, it was still dominated by bankers, who wanted to monitor the 
success of the transition. In 1985, there were four bank directors among the eight members, 
and the presidency was occupied by François Milliet, an administrator of several companies 
including UBS. Arnold, SG’s CEO, was also a member of the Board, as well as two 
watchmakers, Norbert Schenkel, president of Roventa-Henex SA and obviously a former 
shareholder of ASUAG, and Paul Lüthi, president of Rado. This Board did not get involved in 
the operational management of the company. 
In 1985, together with a group of Swiss German investors (Pool Hayek), Nicolas G. Hayek 
                                                 
16
 Pasquier, « Swatch Group », in DHS. 
17
 Fallet, « Nicolas Hayek », in DHS, Hayek 2006, Wegelin 2010. 
18
 Journal de Genève, 16 June 1984. 
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acquired the majority of SG’s capital. He then entered the Board of Directors and became 
president in 1986, in the stead of Milliet. The two watchmakers also left the board shortly 
thereafter, in 1986 for Schenkel and in 1989 for Lüthi. As for the bankers, they stayed on the 
Board but welcomed new members from the Pool Hayek. 
In the short term, the main result of rationalization was to enable the company to become 
profitable once again. After a loss in 1983, SG was back in the black the following year. Of 
course, the profit margin, which amounted at less than 5% of gross sales until 1987, was weak 
and gross sales grew slowly in the 1980s. By the way, it was only in 1989 that SG reached the 
CHF 2 billion mark in gross sales, that is, the peak reached by ASUAG-SSIH in 1974.19 The 
second part of the 1980s thus appears as a turning-point when SG recovered its 
competitiveness on world markets. Usually, key importance is attached to the Swatch in this 
process, but this common view must be discussed. 
 
Fig. 1: Gross sales for SG, as millions of CHF, and net profit as a %, 1983-2010 
 
Source: SG annual reports 
Note: net profit is the profit after depreciations, reserves and taxes. 
 
1.2 The relative importance of the Swatch 
The Swiss collective memory, the story told by SG and academic works usually portray the 
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 Annual reports of ASUAG and SSIH. 
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crucial role of a product innovation in explaining the success of SG and the comeback of the 
Swiss watch industry on the world market: the Swatch.20 Developed as a fashion product, this 
plastic-made quartz watch manufactured in Switzerland was launched in 1983 and 
experienced growing popularity in the world since the end of the 1980s. Its success 
supposedly enabled SG to invest in taking over and restructuring other brands and thereby 
relaunching the entire industry. According to the “legend of the Swatch”, Hayek’s launching 
of a cheap quartz watch, a product which traditional watchmakers did not trust because of 
their conservative mindsets, supposedly made it possible to rescue the Swiss watch industry 
and make it able to compete with Japan once again. 
Due to the lack of data about the various SG brands and products, it is not possible to assess 
precisely the real impact of the Swatch on the firm’s management or to determine which 
products were responsible for its restored competitiveness. However, the Swiss foreign trade 
statistics and the annual reports of the Federation of the Swiss Watch Industry give some 
valuable clues.21 They indeed mention the value and volume of exports of “non-metal 
watches”. Even if these watches are not only Swatches, this brand obviously represents a very 
important place within this category, with the value of its export posting high growth after the 
launch of the Swatch (1983), rising from CHF 13.4 million in 1980 to CHF 225.9 million in 
1985 and a high of CHF 798.7 million in 1993, before falling sharply until 2000 then 
stagnating at an average of CHF 297.6 million CHF in 2000-2009, that is, the same level as 
the second half of the 1980s. 
These numbers do not fully reflect Swatch’s gross sales. On the one hand, they also include 
products from other brands, even if their share is obviously very low due to the general trend 
towards metal products within the Swiss watch industry. On the other hand, not all Swatches 
are contained in these numbers: Swatches sold on Swiss market and metallic Swatches (for 
example the Irony line) are excluded. Yet, as this is the only accessible data, it is interesting to 
compare the value of these exports to SG’s gross sales. This type of watches accounted for 
only a minority share of SG’s gross sales. In the years 1985-1990, it only came to an average 
of 16.0%. During the peak years 1990-1995, the value of exports of non-metal watches was as 
high as 22.8% of SG’s gross sales, but since 1999, this share has been less than 10%. This 
means that some 75-80% of SG’s gross sales came from other businesses in the 1980s-1990s, 
and some 90% in the 2000s. Even if it undoubtedly represents a major profit source, that is, a 
key supply of money for restructuring, the Swatch did not play the overwhelming role that is 
usually thought. In fact, SG’s regained competitiveness is based on two other major elements: 
the rationalization of production systems and a new marketing strategy. 
 
                                                 
20
 Carrera 1991 and Landes 1990.  
21
 Statistique annuelle du commerce extérieur de la Suisse, Berne: Federal Customs Department, various years. 
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2. Rationalization and globalization of production systems (1985-1998) 
The years 1985-1998 were characterized by far-reaching streamlining of the means of 
production. The ASUAG-SSIH merger indeed led to a weakly integrated conglomerate of 
watch companies, and the reorganization of the production of watches, movements and parts 
was a major issue during the first few years. This policy rested upon two key points: 
centralization of movement and parts production in Switzerland; and globalization of 
production systems. 
 
2.1 Centralization of movement and parts production in Switzerland 
One of the first measures adopted was the centralization of movement and parts production 
within the company Eta SA, which belonged to ASUAG until 1983. This was not a new 
policy but rather a continuation of the strategy of merging Eta’s subsidiaries which Thomke 
pursued after he was appointed to head up the firm (1978).22 The objective was the same: the 
concentration of production aimed at rationalizing (reduction of number of models, 
interchangeability of parts) and automating production. However, contrary to what happened 
until the beginning of the 1980s, this policy was applied to all the group’s companies. It led to 
a deep upheaval within the biggest watch companies, which had to stop producing their own 
movements and concentrate on marketing. The rationalization brought functional dissociation 
at the group level, with some enterprises tasked with producing movements and others 
responsible for selling watches. This change particularly affected the most prestigious 
companies of the group: Omega, Longines and Rado stopped producing their own movements 
in 1984-1987. 
The development of production systems also took the form of the acquisition of firms, 
essentially subcontractors for which SG was already a customer. Apart from assembly plants 
opened in Asia and in America (see below), the takeover of two Swiss companies, namely the 
watchcase maker Georges Ruedin SA (1989) and the crown-maker Meco SA (1990), must be 
underlined. Abroad, SG acquired two parts makers in France, Régis Mainier SA (1987) and 
Marc Vuilleumier (1990), as well as the company Frésard Composants SA (1991). In 
Germany, SG bought up a movement and parts maker, Pforzheimer Uhrenwerke PORTA 
GmbH (1990). Buying up production companies in Europe dovetailed with a verticalization 
strategy aimed at strengthening the control of parts supply. 
 
2.2 Globalization of production systems  
The international division of production was the second thrust of the rationalization strategy 
                                                 
22
 Vogt, « Eta », DHS. 
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adopted by SG in the years 1985-1998. In reality, it was not a new strategy in the Swiss watch 
industry. The liberalization of the industry in the 1960s made outward direct investment 
possible, and in the 1970s the main watch companies opened some production plants abroad, 
mainly in South-East Asia.23 Thus, in 1979, ASUAG had a stake in Beta SA, in Brazil, a 
company involved in the assembly of watch movements.24 As for SSIH, in 1981 it owned the 
company Economic Swiss Time, Hong Kong.25 Accordingly, SG’s strategy of globalization 
of production dated far back, but it was rationalized and extended to a larger scale. 
The opening of a production center in Asia was a priority of the management since the 
beginnings of rationalization. As a result, Eta SA opened a plant in China in 1985, which was 
transferred to Thailand the following year due to administrative problems with the Chinese 
bureaucracy.26  The Bangkok-based company Eta (Thailand) Co. Ltd specialized in the 
production of watch components – primarily destined for supplying Swiss plants – and the 
assembly of electronic modules for the Asian market. 27  It experienced high growth, 
characterized by the opening of a subsidiary in Malaysia, Micromechanics Sdn Bhd (1991). In 
1998, Thai exports of watch movements and movement parts amounted to 137.4 million USD, 
of which 45.8 million USD to Switzerland and 72.2 million USD to Hong Kong.28 The 
expansion in Asia was pursued with the opening of a plant in China, Zhuhai SMH 
Watchmaking Ltd., in the Special Economic Zone of Shenzhen (1996). The objective of this 
company was the production of watch components as well as the production of quartz 
watches for the Chinese market.29 However, this second objective, essentially based on the 
launch of the brand Lanco, turned out to be a failure and the Shenzhen plant produced mainly 
quartz movements at the beginning of the 2000s.30 
As for America, the second base for the assembly of movements within the SG outside 
Switzerland, it included two subsidiaries. The first was an assembly plant opened in 1961 by 
American investors in the Virgin Islands, Unitime Co. Ltd.31 This company belonged to the 
American watch distributor Harris, which was taken over in 1973 by Mido, G. Schaeren & 
Cie SA, a member of the holding General Watch Co. controlled by ASUAG, with the 
objective of extending its activities on the US market.32 The second was also an assembly 
plant set up before the 1983 merger, the company SMH do Amazonas, in Brazil. Even if it 
was only mentioned since 1990 as an operational company in the SG’s annual report, it was 
                                                 
23
 Blanc 1988. 
24
 Annual report, 1979, p. 30. 
25
 Annual report, 1980-1981, p. 39. This company was sold to Nimex AG in 1982. 
26
 Journal de Genève, 13 September 1994. 
27
 Journal de Genève, 13 September 1994. 
28
 World Trade Atlas, foreign trade statistics for Thailand, numbers 9108 + 9110. 
29
 Journal de Genève, 14 December 1994. 
30
 Le Temps, 7 May 2004. 
31
 JETRO, 1966, p. 17. On watchmaking in the Virgin Islands, see Oxtoby 1970. 
32
 Journal de Genève, 30 January 1973. 
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obviously the continuation of Beta SA in which ASUAG had a minority stake.33 
The evolution of the structure of SG’s employment illustrates perfectly this globalization of 
production systems. The share of employees in Switzerland, which was 80% in 1983-1985, 
dropped to 71% in 1990 and to 54% in 1998, a proportion which has remained stable until 
now. This internationalization primarily relies on the development of the Asian plants. The 
share of employees in Asia, not mentioned in the 1980s, indeed amounted to 21% in 1992 and 
to 33% in 1998. 
 
2.3 Consequence: better productivity 
The rationalization policy had two major results. Firstly, it boosted production growth. The 
volume of watches and movements produced by SG shot up from 44.3 million units in 1985 
to 86.9 million in 1992 and to 118.8 million in 1998. Levels of growth are characterized by 
two periods, with high growth in 1985-1992 (annual growth of 8.3%), followed by weaker 
growth (5.3%), a difference related to productivity trends. 
Secondly, it let SG regain its competitiveness on the world market thanks to better control 
over production costs. The company’s productivity trends between 1984 and 2004 clearly 
highlight the key issue of this period. Even if this index is approximate, as it does not 
distinguish between blue-collar and white-collar workers, or between complete watches and 
movements, it sheds some light on the issue of rationalization of production. The average 
amount of units produced per employee indeed grew steadily until 1992, rising from 3,329 in 
1984 to 6,075 in 1992. Since 1992, productivity has remained relatively stable, with an 
average of 6,034 units in 1992-2004.34 
 
2.4 A movement producer 
What watch types were made within this rationalized and globalized production system? SG’s 
annual reports contained very few detailed data on products. However, some production 
statistics published in 1986-1987 make it possible to grasp this question. 
Data published in the 1986 and 1987 annual reports show that SG produced essentially 
movements (see table 1): their volume amounted to more than 30 million per year, as against 
15 million for complete watches. Moreover, they were mostly quartz movements (98.4% of 
volume and 95.3% of value). The high proportion of movements can be explained by the fact 
that one of the two enterprises merged into SG in 1983, ASUAG, was actually a trust that had 
                                                 
33
 This company is not mentioned in the annual reports until 1989, probably due to the fact it was a minority 
stake. In 1990, SG possessed 70% of shares, which explains why it entered the list of companies belonging to 
SG. 
34
 The volume of production is unknown since 2004. 
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controlled parts and movement-blanks production for the entire Swiss watch industry since 
the 1930s. Accordingly, SG has perpetuated its historical role of movement supplier for 
virtually all Swiss watch enterprises. Thus, the proportion of movements sold in Switzerland 
amounted to 36.9% and 32.8% of the total, for volumes in excess of 10 million pieces. 
Obviously, movements represented a substantially lower average value (CHF 10.6 CHF in 
1986) than watches (CHF 83.1 in 1986). Yet their sale was important for SG. In 1986, even if 
it amounted to a mere CHF 326 million, that is 17.9% of gross sales, it was a sum similar to 
the one for exports of non-metallic watches (Swatch) that year. The new growth experienced 
by the Swiss watch industry since 1985, with a volume of completed watches rising from less 
than 20 million pieces by year in 1982-1984 to 21.1 million in 1985 and 34.9 million on 
average in the 1990s, undeniably benefited the main producer of movements. Yet, since 1988, 
SG’s annual reports no longer provide any data related to movement volume and shares. The 
firm’s communication strategy has emphasized the worldwide success of the Swatch as the 
key profit source, and began to hide the fact that it was first and foremost a movement 
producer. Nevertheless, since 1997, the value of the division “movements and components” 
has represented sales of CHF 1.2 billion, that is, 32.2% of gross sales. Within ten years, this 
division apparently grew steadily. Finally, the point should be made that SG did not only sell 
watch movements to Swiss companies. Its main customers for this product in 1986 and 1987 
were actually foreign companies, mostly Asian and American. It is not possible to know the 
nature of these movements, but these were apparently products made in SG’s plants abroad. 
 
Tab. 1: SG sales as products, 1,000 pieces, 1986-1987 
Source: SG annual report, 1987, p. 10. 
 
Regarding complete watches, the only data published are those concerning the years 1986 and 
1987. Two comments are in order. Firstly, the domestic market appears as more important 
 1986 1987 
 Movements Watches Movements Watches 
 N % N % N % N % 
Switzerland 11349 36.9 1400 9.4 10040 32.8 1420 8.6 
Europe 1494 4.9 6034 40.3 846 2.8 6762 40.7 
Far East 10153 33.0 463 3.1 12510 40.9 762 4.6 
America 7484 24.3 6169 41.2 7192 23.5 6700 40.4 
Other 308 1.0 893 6.0 3 0.0 957 5.8 
 
Total 30788 100 14959 100 30591 100 16601 100 
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than is usually considered, as it amounted to some 10% of the volume. Secondly, this 
underscores SG’s extreme dependency on big traditional outlets: Europe and the USA. SG, 
which exported 90% of its finished watches there, was more dependent on them than the 
Swiss watch industry as a whole (83.4% of exports).35 While Europe was still a competitive 
market for the Swiss watch industry, due to good control of the distribution network and a 
competitive advantage of Swiss brands over American and Asian ones, the US posed a 
problem for SG. The strong dependency on this market, which absorbed more than 40% of 
sales volume in 1986 and 1987, reveals above all the absence of other fast-growing markets, 
especially in Asia. The share of the Far East came to a paltry 3.1% of sales volume in 1986 
and 4.6% in 1987. For the entire Swiss watch industry, only the three biggest Asian outlets – 
Hong Kong, Japan, Singapore – reached 5.7% of exports of complete watches in 1986. 
 
2.5 Financial impact of restructuring 
The main financial consequence of the restructuring of the means of production and of the 
distribution system was the progressive autonomization of the company as well as the end of 
reliance on bank capital. SG became a very lucrative company, ploughing back a large share 
of its profits into developing the firm. Net profit after depreciation, reserve and taxes posted 
continuous growth, rising from 3.3% of gross sales in 1985 to 10.7% in 1995. This excellent 
financial situation made it possible to distribute ever-larger dividends (5% in 1986; 12% in 
1990; 18% in 1992). 
Yet the relentless growth of profits should not obscure a key element of the firm’s 
management: its self-financing policy. The modernization of the means of production and the 
growth of the company went together with ever-diminishing dependency on the banks. A huge 
amount of profits were ploughed back into reserves. Apart from paid-up capital, SG’s 
accumulated equity capital came to CHF 2.0 billion in 1995, as compared with a scant CHF 
190 million in 1985 and 750 million in 1990. Measured as a percentage of the balance sheet, 
shareholders’ equity posted a rising trend until 1997. Whereas it was only 32.1% in 1985, it 
passed the 50% mark in 1989 and reached 70.1% in 1995. This financial empowerment 
enabled SG to develop without relying on bank loans. For Nicolas Hayek, who was only a 
minority shareholder in 1985, this strategy was the way to become independent in the medium 
term. As for banks, their disinvestment from ASUAG and SSIH was an objective which went 
back to the 1970s. The evolution of SG’s governance clearly reflects this process of 
emancipation, with the successive departure of most of the bankers from the Board of 
Directors: Rolf Beeler (BPS) and Paul Risch (BCB) in 1993, followed by Walter G. Frehner 
(SBS) in 1997. Since 1998, there has only been one banker on the Board, Peter Gross (UBS). 
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3. A new marketing strategy 
The second main thrust of the strategy which made it possible for SG to establish itself as the 
world’s leading watch group was the adoption of a new marketing strategy. This occurred in 
two phases. Firstly, during the years 1985-1995, the focus was primarily on the restructuring 
of the distribution system, a move which dovetailed with the group’s overall rationalization 
policy. Secondly, since the mid-1990s, SG adopted a brand repositioning strategy. 
 
4.1 Rationalization of the distribution system (1985-1995) 
Since the middle of the 1980s, the restructuring of the means of production went together with 
a profound rationalization of the distribution system, characterized by the creation of 
distribution companies responsible for all of the group’s brands on the main markets. When 
SG was founded in 1983, each watch company had its own distribution network, as a result of 
which SG possessed several distribution and sale companies in some countries. For example, 
in 1985, it had eight subsidiaries in the USA, five in Germany and two in Hong Kong. 
The principle of rationalization adopted in the second part of the 1980s was premised on a 
single distribution company in one market. As a result, SG closed several of them down. In 
1991, it had only one such network in the USA and one in Germany. What is more, SG 
liquidated SA Longines pour la Suisse (1993), Omega Electronics Ltd in UK (1994) and SMH 
Trading Far East in Hong Kong (1994), as well as SMH Venezuela (1994). At the same time, 
however, it opened many other distribution companies in other countries: Brazil (1986), 
Ireland (1986), Netherlands (1986), Singapore (1986), Malaysia (1988), Austria (1993), 
British Virgin Islands (1993), Canada (1993), Portugal (1993) and South Korea (1994). 
The control of distribution system appears as a key element in the construction of a global 
network to enhance all group brands worldwide. This geographical extension policy was 
subsequently pursued in the 1990s and the 2000s. 
 
4.1.1 SG’s brand strategy 
In an initial phase, the centralization policy had little impact on the marketing strategies of 
different brands. It focused essentially on logistics. In the second half of the 1980s, there was 
not really any brand strategy at the group level, even though top management decided to 
abandon some low-end brands which were not booming, such as Record Watch and Baume. 
Also, the only two brands launched during this period, the children’s watches Flik Flak (1987) 
and the fashion watches Pierre Balmain (1987), did not come from any marketing department 
but rather from the group’s movement maker, the company Eta SA, which had found an 
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opportunity to diversify its outlets and extend its activities. For other brands, the image 
differentiation between brands was not very pronounced. Omega and Longines remained the 
historical rivals they had been since the end of the 19th century, with various lines of products 
embodying very similar values (precision, sports, fashion, elegance). There was also 
ambivalence in the middle range (Certina, Mido, Tissot), where differentiation was also 
difficult, even if Tissot was chosen for launching new products, such as watches with a stone 
case, the Rock Watch (1985), a wooden case, the Wood Watch (1988) or with a dual analog 
and digital display, the Two Timer (1986). The two other brands to distinguish themselves 
were Rado, which featured a modern design, and Hamilton, which cultivated its American 
origins (so-called American Tradition line).  
Clearly, the general lack of differentiation can be explained by the need to begin by reforming 
the in-house marketing strategy of each brand. The objective was rationalization, through a 
drastic reduction of the number of models. For example, at Omega, the number of different 
models, which amounted to some 1,600 at the beginning of the 1980s, was slashed to 850 in 
1985 and to 284 in 1986. In October 1987, management announced a further reduction to 
about 100 different models. This reorganization of supply put Omega back in the black in 
1986 for the first time in many years.36 
In 1990, however, Hayek restructured SG’s Management Board to implement brand 
management on a group scale, characterized by brand differentiation and market segmentation, 
that is, a strategy requiring stronger coordination between the various brand managers. Thus, 
the Management Board, which had been in charge of overseeing the ASUAG-SSIH merger 
and the streamlining of the company in the 1980s, was reorganized. Apart from Anton Bally, 
head of production and Eta’s new director, the eight persons appointed at the Extended Group 
Management Board in 1990 were the brand directors for most of them: Walter von Kaenel 
(Longines), Hans Kurth (Omega), Peter Petersen (Swatch) and Roland Streule (Rado). There 
were also some representatives of high-tech companies (Willi Salathé) and of outside parts 
makers (Paul Wyser). Finally, two managers from marketing and distribution were appointed. 
The first was Raymond Zeitoun, president of the distribution company SMH France. The 
second was a manager who came from marketing and communications, Franco Bosisio, 
former brand manager at Procter & Gamble and marketing director at Cartier Italy, before 
joining SG (1986). This centralization of power in marketing enabled the adoption of a global 
strategy and the control of its implementation on the various markets.37 
In the following years, appointments to the Management Board and at the Extended 
Management Board confirmed their role as a marketing platform. SG brands must not 
compete with each other, but rather target different groups. As far as the implementation of 
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this new strategy was concerned, the takeover of Blancpain proved pivotal. 
  
4.1.2 A decisive step: the takeover of Blancpain (1992) 
History and tradition entered SG through Blancpain. This brand, which belonged to SSIH, had 
been acquired in 1983 for the modest sum of CHF 18,000 by Jean-Claude Biver, former 
manager at Audemars-Piguet, and Jacques Piguet, CEO of Frédéric Piguet SA, one of the very 
rare independent luxury watch movement makers.38 The strategy adopted by Biver went 
against the entire industry: refusing to use quartz movements, he built the image of a brand 
based on tradition and technical excellence, the foundations of the brand’s repositioning as a 
top-end watchmaker. Quoting the year 1735 as the origin of the enterprise (Blancpain was the 
name of a family which has apparently been involved in watchmaking since this date), this 
company declared itself the “world’s oldest watch brand”39 and encountered a quick and 
growing success, selling its watches, often equipped with complications (moon-phase, 
tourbillion, erotic figures, etc.) as craft products, that is, luxury goods. The firm’s gross sales 
were booming, soaring from CHF 8.9 million in 1985 to CHF 56 million in 1991.40 
Nevertheless, they were small in relation to SG’s gross sales (CHF 2.0 billion in 1991). Yet 
when Hayek bought Blancpain in 1992, he was interesting in doing more than merely 
enlarging market share – he was looking for a new kind of know-how, in marketing. Indeed, 
the takeover provided an opportunity to internalize the marketing skills of Biver – appointed 
to the Extended Management Board in 1992 and to the Management Board in 1993 – and his 
team, then to apply them to the group as a whole. Incidentally, Biver was entrusted with the 
rebranding of Omega, of which he has been Marketing and Communications Manager since 
1992.41 
 
4.1.3 The choice of Omega 
In the mid-1990s, SG engaged in a policy of differentiation and repositioning of its main 
brands in the luxury segment, in order to boost their complementarity and help the company 
compete in various segments. This was particularly the case in the so-called accessible luxury 
segment, between the main historical brands of the group, Omega, Longines and Rado. The 
objective was to strengthen their own image and to depict them as different and 
complementary products, destined for different customers. Omega was selected as a luxury 
consumer good with the aim of competing with Rolex on the world market. It soon became 
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the group’s main brand. In this perspective, Longines and Rado had to be repositioned to no 
longer compete with Omega. 
Longines was repositioned in a less expensive segment and rebranded as a product of 
elegance and classicism, which did not clash with other brands in the same price range, Rado 
(high-tech and modern design) and Union Glashütte (technical tradition and classicism). For 
example, in the 1990s Longines refocused on sponsoring activities suited to an image of 
classical elegance (horse riding, gymnastics, ski, tennis, classical music), relinquishing former 
fields such as Formula One racing (1992). Moreover, it reinforced its image of a historical 
pioneer in watchmaking with the publication in 1992 of two books, one recounting the 
corporate history and the other being the editing of a famous report on American watch 
companies written in 1876 by Jacques David, technical director of Longines at that time.42 
Unlike Blancpain, which emphasized the traditional know-how of the watchmaker’s craft, 
Longines meshes with the tradition of the manufacture that has played a pioneering role in 
modernizing and industrializing watch production, an image better suited to its accessible 
luxury position. 
As for Rado, it underwent a development very similar to Longines, characterized by the 
disinvestment of the brand in favor of Omega. Founded as a watch movement making 
company in 1917, this firm launched completed watches with the brand Rado in 1954.43 It 
quickly established itself as one of the main Swiss watch brands in the Far East. In 1982, it 
posted gross sales of some CHF 200 million for an annual production of about 1 million 
watches, 96% of which were sold in the Far East.44 At the time, one of Rado’s features was 
the use of high-tech materials (hard metal, ceramic, lanthanum) for some of its models, since 
1962 (DiaStar watch). Thus, when SG was created, Rado occupied a strong position among 
watch makers. Its CEO, Paul Lüthi, was even the only brand representative on the Board of 
Directors (1984-1989). Despite its restructuring in 1987, with the personal involvement of 
Thomke, Rado was clearly still one of the group’s main brands. However, SG’s new 
marketing strategy made it a global brand specialized in futurist designs. This differentiation 
aimed especially at giving Omega a free hand in the top range, especially in Asia. Thus, in 
2010, new generations of urbanized Chinese were more familiar with the brand Omega than 
with Rado, unlike their elders.45 
 
4.2 Towards luxury (1995-2010) 
The marketing strategy adopted in the early 1990s was pursued and developed in the 
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following years. The main thrusts of this policy were the repositioning towards luxury; the 
strengthening of differentiation between the brands; and huge investments in distribution 
systems. Thus, while the company’s growth relied on rationalization in the 1980s, it 
subsequently came to depends more and more on marketing. The production system was even 
reorganized from this perspective – with a shift from movement producer to complete watch 
seller. 
 
4.2.1 First line: the repositioning towards luxury  
SG’s repositioning strategy dovetailed with the general context of the sea change in the luxury 
industry that took place in the 1980s.46 Whereas this sector had previously been characterized 
by elitism, discretion and handiwork, it experienced in the 1980s a trend towards 
democratization based on brand globalization and the enlargement of customers, accompanied 
by a concentration of luxury enterprises within very profitable industrial groups. However, 
this democratization of luxury led to the stronger distinction between exclusive luxury and 
accessible luxury. 47  Exclusive luxury describes high-quality and excessively expensive 
products, designed for a small social elite – that is, the traditional acceptation of luxury. As for 
accessible luxury, it designates brand products sold like luxury goods but financially 
accessible to a large clientele.48 This product differentiation aims at different targets and 
makes it possible to pursue simultaneously strategies based on exclusivism and 
democratization of luxury. 
The watch industry is perfectly suited to this context, with, for example, the entry of 
Richemont (1988) and LVMH (1999) into the watch business. SG adopted a repositioning 
strategy based on both the firm’s acquisition and rebranding of products. The first objective 
was to enlarge its portfolio of exclusive luxury brands, as it only owned Blancpain in this 
segment, by purchasing four brands: Léon Hatot (1999), Breguet (1999), Glashütter 
Uhrentriebe (2000) and Jaquet-Droz (2000).  
The strategy was the same in all four cases. SG snapped up prestigious brands whose main 
weaknesses were rooted in their marketing strategies: narrow distribution systems, and a lack 
of a distinctive design. Accordingly, SG defined specific designs for each brand (jewel-watch 
of Art Deco inspiration for Léon Hatot; hands and dials reminiscent of some key works of 
Abraham-Louis Breguet; modern design inspired by Pierre Jaquet-Droz’s classic models; 
classicism and grandes complications for Glashütter Original), integrated them into its 
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worldwide distribution system and turned them into global brands. Moreover, the takeover of 
these four companies led to streamlined production of luxury watches, as the manufacture of 
high-quality movements was reorganized and centralized within SG in the 2000s. 
Finally, the skills acquired in designing and marketing exclusive luxury watches led SG to 
sign an agreement with Tiffany & Co. in 2007. Since then, it has also produced watches for 
the prestigious American jeweler. 
 
4.2.2 Second line: better brand positioning 
The involvement in exclusive luxury aimed essentially at promoting accessible luxury brands, 
particularly Omega. Of course, some exclusive luxury brands boast ample profit margins, 
estimated at 23% for Breguet and at 20% for Blancpain in 2006. However, they amount to 
only a small share of gross sales. According to the consulting firm Helvea SA, they accounted 
for a mere 12.6% of SG’s watch sales in 2006 (see table 2). Yet they offer strong growth 
potential, due to their recent integration into a globally organized group. 
The main benefit of these brands is rather indirect: they enhance the image of other SG brands 
and facilitate their repositioning. The brands that generate the largest profits are indeed 
accessible luxury brands, mainly Omega, which accounted for one-third of watch sales in 
2006 (33.9%), but also Longines (9.7%) and Rado (9.3%). The weight of these brands 
highlights the issue of the democratization of luxury in the watch industry. 
As for the mid-range, apart from Tissot, the group’s third brand in terms of sales in 2006, it 
represents only a fraction of gross sales: taken together, Balmain, Certina, Hamilton and Mido 
accounted for only 3.5%. Nevertheless, SG has not given up on this segment. As there is still 
a global market for such products, it pursues its involvement, for example by launching cheap 
watches for the American fashion company Calvin Klein in 1997. The same year, it tried once 
again to market the Lanco brand on the Chinese market. Even if the Lanco venture ended in 
failure, the attempt underscores SG’s interest in the mid-range. 
 
Tab. 2: SG watch brands, 2010 
Name Year of 
acquisition 
Sales in 2006 
(million CHF) 
As a % of total 
watch sales 
Selling price 
ranges (CHF) 
Breguet 1999 305 7.8 >10'000 
Blancpain 1992 115 2.9 >10'000 
Glashütte Original 2000 60 1.5 >10'000 
Jaquet Droz 2000 9 0.2 >10'000 
Léon Hatot 1999 5 0.1 >10'000 
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Source: estimates of Helvea SA (The Swatch Group, Geneva: Helvea, 2007). 
Note: these estimates obviously largely overevaluated Swatch’s sales, in comparison with the data of Swiss 
foreign trade statistics (exports of non-metallic watches) 
 
4.2.3 Third line: strengthening of the sale network 
The vertical integration of distribution has been a key issue in the luxury watch industry since 
the end of the 1990s. The objective was not only to better control distribution and sales of 
products, but also to internalize profits from this activity. Thus, in order to strengthen the 
exclusive image of luxury goods, distribution became a major issue. As a result, the 
verticalization of distribution affected first and foremost the group’s luxury brands, through 
the creation of flagship boutiques. 
The priority given to the distribution and sale of complete watches resulted in the creation of 
tens of new subsidiaries, whose number rose from 23 in 1998 to 65 in 2009. Two comments 
are in order as far as their functional breakdown is concerned. Firstly, so-called emerging 
markets were given special attention. Whereas SG focused on traditional outlets until the end 
of the 1990s, especially Western Europe, it shifted to new markets after 2000, with the 
creation of distribution companies in India (2001), Mexico (2001), Russia (2002), Thailand 
(2002), Poland (2004), Taiwan (2004), United Arab Emirates (2006) and South Africa (2009). 
SG also took stakes in retail companies, especially in Thailand (2002) and in the United Arab 
Emirates (2008). In this context, China occupies a special position, as it included ten 
distribution and sale companies in 2009 as against only two in 1998. 
Omega 1983 1’325 33.9 >1'800 
Tiffany & Co 2007 - - - 
Longines 1983 380 9.7 900-3'000  
Rado 1983 365 9.3 750-4'000  
Union Glashütte 2000 - - - 
Tissot 1983 395 10.1 300-900 
CK Watch 1997 150 3.8 150-1'500  
Balmain 1987 
138 3.5 350-2'000 
Certina 1983 
Mido 1983 
Hamilton 1983 
Swatch 1983 640 16.4  <70 
Flik Flak 1987 - - - 
Endura 1983 - - - 
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Secondly, the creation of retail companies must be underlined, as it became a key thrust of 
marketing strategy. This was especially the case for luxury brands, with Les Boutiques 
companies opened in many countries (Germany, China, France, UK, Italy, Switzerland, USA). 
Since 2000, SG’s main brands have their own flagship boutiques, which are designed to serve 
not only as sales outlets but also as showcases and venues for events graced by global stars 
and ambassadors. Finally, the strengthening of links with local companies which control wide 
retail networks can also be observed, sometimes leading to the creation of joint ventures 
(China, United Arab Emirates, Thailand). In the United States, SG took over the chain store 
Borsack (1999) and signed an agreement with Tourneau to open watch stores in luxury malls 
(2006). 
 
4.2.4 Fourth line: a production system devoted to marketing 
The production system took on the group’s new strategy and reflects an evolution dictated by 
the repositioning towards luxury. Its main features are the vertical integration of producers of 
external parts (habillage); the end of the supply of movement-blanks and parts to Swiss watch 
makers outside SG; and the reorganization of production of quartz movements abroad.  
On the whole, the production system reached equilibrium at the end of the 1990s. After 1998, 
the proportion of employees abroad was stable (54% in 1998; 51% in 2005; 54% in 2009) and 
productivity stagnated at an average of 5,903 pieces by employee in 1999-2004.49 The 
large-scale reorganization of the production system in the 1980s and 1990s was over. 
However, despite this apparent stability of the production system, its structure shows rather an 
important change, with the vertical integration of watch external parts producers (cases, dials, 
hands, straps). This strategy is consistent with the issue of brand repositioning towards luxury. 
The internalization of competences and know-how in the field of design became a major 
challenge and can be seen in other watch groups.50 Until then, SG relied primarily on 
independent suppliers. One after the other, it took over producers of cases Favre & Perret SA 
(1999), of hands Universo SA (2000), of dials Rubattel & Weyermann SA (2002) and MOM 
Le Prélet SA (2006), of indexes for dials Indexor SA (2007), and of oils Moebius & Fils 
(2008), all in Switzerland. Abroad, SG acquired the German dial maker Deutsche Zifferblatt 
Manufaktur GmbH à Pforzheim (2006). The internal reorganization of the production of 
high-quality movements and parts must also be underlined here. The movement maker 
Frederic Piguet SA, bought up in 1992, was merged by its main customer, Blancpain SA, 
while Valdar SA was merged by François Golay SA (2010). This dual restructuring made it 
possible to strengthen the production capacity of Blancpain with the verticalization of the 
manufacture, on the one hand, and to rationalize the production of high-quality parts, on the 
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other hand. What is more, it reinforced the image of the traditional manufacture producing 
in-house all the parts it needs, used to maximum benefit in advertising. 
The second feature of the production system since the end of the 1990s has been the decision 
to stop supplying movement-blanks and parts to customers outside the group. This change 
dovetails with the overall repositioning of the Swiss watch industry towards luxury, which 
was accompanied by a steady decline in the volume of watch exports, while their value kept 
rising. The number of watches exported averaged 34.9 million items in the 1990s, then 
dropped in 1998-2000 before stabilizing at a new average of 25.5 million items in 2001-2007. 
For SG, this marked a fundamental change: as the main supplier of movements to the whole 
industry, it implied a shrinking of the market. Movement-blanks and parts sold outside the 
group represented 17.1% of gross sales in 2000, 11.9% in 2005 and only 7.6% in 2010. 
The repositioning towards luxury made it possible for SG to throw off the yoke of trade in 
watch movements, when management decided to stop supplying competitors. The 
announcement made in 2002 that SG would no longer sell parts and movement-blanks outside 
the group after 2006 led to fierce reactions: it was indeed estimated that at the time, SG 
produced 80% of movement-blanks and more than half all the movements produced in 
Switzerland. 51  In 2002, the Federal Commission of Concurrence (Comco) opened an 
investigation into the company Eta SA for abuse of a dominant position, forcing it to continue 
its deliveries. In December 2002, Eta replied and announced a sharp price rise, especially for 
high-quality movements.52 Finally, an agreement was signed in November 2006 by Comco 
and SG, whereby the latter agree to keep selling movement-blanks until 2010.53 Subseqently, 
in 2010, SG’s management reaffirmed its desire to pursue its strategy and put an end to such 
trade. SG’s main competitors were no longer Japanese watch makers, but precisely other 
Swiss watch companies, whose growth SG clearly has no reason to support. Calibers supplied 
to competitors were sold worldwide as luxury products.  
Finally, the third feature of the production system after 1995 was the pursuit of the production 
of movements in Asia, at least until 2005-2006. Even if data are very fragmented and virtually 
nonexistent since 2004, several clues militate in favour of such a hypothesis. Firstly, the 
production volume of watches and movements went from 103.5 million units in 1999 to 127.1 
million in 2004, that is, a growth of 22.8% in five years. During this same period, however, 
the volume of Swiss exports fell steadily from 36.7 million units in 1999 to 30.7 million in 
2004. Accordingly, even if we consider all these exports as SG’s products, this still leaves a 
balance of some 100 million units produced outside Switzerland in 2004. The company 
Zhuhai SMH Watchmaking Ltd. alone would have produced around 80-90 million units that 
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year. 54  According to Chinese foreign trade statistics, exports of watch movements to 
Switzerland amounted to an average of USD 37.9 million in 2000-2004, making Switzerland 
the second-largest outlet (28.7%) of the Chinese watch industry for movements, after Hong 
Kong (58.8%) but before Japan (7.5%).55 This trade decreased strongly in 2005 (USD 11.3 
million) and after (less than USD 2 million per year in 2006-2009), precisely when SG 
announced its decision to cut back production in China. 
Secondly, SG closed down assembly plants outside Asia. According to the annual reports, 
production was stopped in the Virgin Islands (2003) and in Brazil (2005), at a time when 
production in Thailand and in China was growing fast. Yet this reflected not a simple transfer 
of production to Asia, but rather a real globalization of production systems. America’s 
increasingly important role as an outlet for SG in the early 2000s – 7% of volume in 1999; 
18% in 2004 – was clearly due to the delivery of quartz movements made in China or in 
Thailand. 
Thirdly, and lastly, Asia took on growing importance in SG’s gross sales, rising from 28% in 
1999 to 35% in 2004 and 44% in 2009. Yet this steady increase was undoubtedly not limited 
to the trade of luxury watches in China, a phenomenon which was not all that significant in 
the first half of the 2000s. 
However, SG announced in 2005 the closure of “production facilities”56 in Asia, without 
giving any details. Was it Chinese plants of the group, which would explain the sudden drop 
in Chinese exports of movements to Switzerland since 2005? Owing to SG’s lack of 
communication concerning its production centers outside Europe, this question cannot be 
answered.57 In any case, even if the repositioning towards luxury of the Swiss watch industry 
would have led to a drop of parts sourced from Asia, SG’s production centers situated in 
China, Thailand and Malaysia are still integrated within the group’s organizational structure 
and still producing. 
 
4.4 The case of Omega 
Omega undoubtedly best embodies the changes experienced by SG since the mid-1990s. The 
success of this brand, which accounted for about one-third of all group watch sales in 2006, is 
indeed emblematic of SG’s new marketing strategy. 
In the mid-1990s, SG decided to make Omega, one the oldest and most prestigious Swiss 
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watch companies,58 its flagship brand and to reposition it in the accessible luxury segment 
with a view to competing with Rolex, the world’s best known watch brand.59 This strategy 
was worked out by a new management team led by Blancpain’s director, Jean-Claude Biver, 
who became Marketing and Product Director of Omega in 1994. He brought with him several 
new managers with whom he implemented a rebranding policy, especially Michele Sofisti and 
Aldo Magata.60 Former marketing director of Ferrari, Sofisti entered Omega in 1995 and was 
promoted to CEO two years later, before directing the brand Swatch (2000).61 As for Magada, 
he entered Omega as Vice-President of the Marketing Division in 1993, after a career in the 
pharmaceutical and electronics industry and four years as Product Manager at Piaget. He left 
Omega in 1997 to pursue a career in various watch companies (Ebel, Gucci, Reuge).62 The 
marketing strategy implemented by this team was characterized by the rebranding and the 
restructuring of the distribution system. 
 
4.4.1 Rebranding strategy 
Firstly, the rebranding strategy was founded on the strengthening of Omega’s threefold 
legitimacy – technique, history and glamour – on which the new brand image has been based 
since then. To start with, Omega reinforced its image of technical excellence. The 
chronometry certificates, which attest to watches’ technical quality, show a trend since 1960 
that highlights the strategic changes adopted by Omega in this respect during half a century. 
Relations with Rolex, which remained attached to a management model founded on the mass 
production of high-quality watches, also shed light on the challenge of Omega’s 
repositioning.63 Until 1974, Omega was, together with Rolex, the main manufacturer of 
chronometers: between 1961 and 1974, their shares amounted to 48.9% for Omega and 38.2% 
for Rolex. After 1974, Omega entered a period of crisis, which apparently spared Rolex. The 
number of certificates issued nosedived from 190,396 in 1974 to less than 30,000 per year in 
1980-1983. After SG was established, the restructuring of the group, and of Omega in 
particular, led to a dramatic drop in the registration of chronometers, which averaged a scant 
5,657 in 1985-1989. With only 5.7% of all the certificates, Omega relinquished this segment 
to its rival Rolex, which enjoyed a virtual monopoly (89.2%). Omega then adopted a new 
strategy in the early 1990s aimed at recovering its place in chronometry. Since 1994, Omega 
has evinced an upwards trend (108,516 certificates in 1994; 146,144 in 2000; 377,514 in 
2008), enabling it to regain market share (12.7% in 1994; 14.2% in 2000; 23.6% in 2008). 
Omega’s repositioning as the main chronometer maker in Switzerland alongside Rolex was 
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designed to restore the brand’s technical legitimacy.  
This strategy was reinforced by the relaunching of a tourbillion model (1994) and above all 
by the use of a new kind of escapement, called “coaxial” (1997), followed by the launching of 
a new movement equipped with this escapement (2007). This purely marketing event marks a 
noteworthy break, insofar as the rationalization adopted in the 1980s aimed precisely at 
abandoning the in-house development of movements by each brand and at adopting 
standardization. However, the repositioning of some brands towards accessible luxury made 
this change a necessity. Even if the consumer has trouble understanding the working and 
usefulness of such an innovation, it enables Omega to affirm its own technical excellence. 
Secondly, Omega reinforced its historical legitimacy, its communication strategy aimed at 
emphasizing the long tradition of its innovative nature and technical excellence. The 1998 
commemoration of the 150th jubilee of Omega’s founding provided an opportunity to 
celebrate the firm’s historical roots, with for example the publication of a nearly 500-page 
corporate history – Omega Saga – underlining notably the development of sports timing, the 
prizes won in chronometry competitions and the involvement in the journey to the Moon, as 
many events combining tradition and excellence.64 However, the event which constitutes a 
real break in the historical discourse of the company was undoubtedly the organization of the 
auction Omegamania by Antiquorum in Geneva in 2007.65 In 1989, this auction company 
specialized in horology started organizing thematic auctions related to prestigious brands and 
watchmakers (Patek Philippe, 1989 and 1999; Breguet, 1991; Rolex, 1992; Vacheron 
Constantin, 1994 and 2005; Cartier, 1996; etc.), 66  which significantly boosted brand 
recognition. 67  The thematic auction devoted to Omega therefore helped to strengthen 
recognition of its historical value and technical excellence. Omega’s historical legitimacy was 
also backed by the establishment of special sale outlets, for example the Omega Vintage 
boutique, opened at Burlington Arcade, London, a store which sold only old models (2008). 
Finally, Omega’s repositioning was based on glamour legitimacy. Whereas efforts to advertise 
and communicate this brand relied primarily on objects, that is, watches themselves, until the 
1990s, emphasizing their technical and esthetical qualities, show business stars made a 
noteworthy arrival when American supermodel Cindy Crawford was engaged as an 
ambassador (1995). This change was not peculiar to Omega but could be seen throughout the 
luxury goods industry, where the status of Hollywood stars shifted from customer to emblem 
of the brands. Since then, Omega has hired various sport, fashion and movie stars as 
ambassadors, the best symbol of the globalization of luxury being obviously James Bond, 
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who also became an ambassador in 1995.68 
 
4.4.2 Reform of the distribution system 
The second thrust of Omega’s new marketing strategy was the reform of the distribution 
system, with a view to improving the visibility of the brand rather than the density of the sales 
network. The rise towards luxury and the transformation of a non-specialized brand into an 
accessible luxury good must go together with a distribution system that is consistent with this 
new image. Thus, as Helvea noted in a report on SG in 2006, Omega had a huge sales 
network in the early 2000s, but it was radically restructured in the middle of the decade: the 
number of sale outlets was slashed from 4,800 to 3,000, with Germany, UK and Japan 
experiencing a reduction of 20-30% of the number of outlets.69 The sites that were dropped 
were usually retailers who did not offer the Omega brand sufficient visibility. Together with 
this reduction, the opening of Omega flagship boutiques was in full sway. Omega was indeed 
one of the main SG brands to benefit from the system of flagship boutiques. The first was 
opened at Zurich in 2000, in collaboration with an independent retailer with whom a joint 
venture was created. In 2010, there were 178 Omega boutiques in the world, of which 71 in 
continental China, 10 in Hong Kong and 3 in Macao.70 They play a key role in the marketing 
of Omega’s products.  
 
4.5 A new Eldorado: China 
As the example of Omega shows, China has been the driving force of SG’s growth since the 
mid-2000s. Even though SG provides limited data on sales by region, Asia’s share of gross 
sales has jumped from an average of 28.3% in 1995-2000 to 37% in 2005 and 44% in 2009. 
Of course, these data include other sectors than only complete watches – notably the sale of 
movements and electronic parts made in Asia. However, the growing dependence on Asia 
occurred parallel to the repositioning strategy towards luxury and the production of complete 
watches. Moreover, China’s position has become stronger and stronger in terms of SG’s gross 
sales. Since 2008, SG has published sales statistics for the so-called “Greater China” market, 
including continental China, Hong Kong and Taiwan. Business in this area amounted to 23% 
of SG’s gross sales in 2008 and to 28% in 2009. 
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Fig. 2: Swiss watch exports to China, 2001-2010 
 
Source: FHS 
Note: these data do not include Hong Kong, where a large share of watch imports are re-exported to unknown 
destinations. Hong Kong accounts for an average of 15.2% of the value of Swiss watch exports between 2001 
and 2010, and has experienced very high growth since 2009 (19.7% in 2010).  
 
At present, dependency on China is a general tendency for the Swiss watch industry as a 
whole. After China joined the World Trade Organization in 2001, Swiss exports to the country 
boomed, rising from CHF 36 million in 2001 to a peak of 826 million in 2008, then falling 
slightly due to the world financial crisis (CHF 700 million in 2009) before increasing again to 
set a new record in 2010 (CHF 1,099 million). In terms of market share, business with China 
has also recorded steady growth, increasing from less than 1% of Swiss watch exports in 2001 
and 2002 to 6.8% in 2010. If we add Hong Kong and Taiwan, Chinese outlets accounted for 
22.4% in 2008 and 28.4% in 2010, that is, similar shares to SG. 
Yet SG managed to strengthen its position in China during the world crisis: indeed, its sales in 
Greater China rose from CHF 1.3 billion in 2008 to 1.4 billion in 2009. If this sum includes 
only watches exported from Switzerland, this would mean that SH controlled 34% of Swiss 
watch exports to this region in 2008 and 46% in 2009. These proportions are obviously 
exaggerated due to the fact that SG sales in Greater China probably include products other 
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than watches (electronic parts) and some watch movements and parts produced out of 
Switzerland. However, it is not exaggerated to talk of SG’s growing domination of the watch 
business in China. 
Above all, the key thrust of the marketing strategy was collaboration with one of the biggest 
Chinese watch distributors, Xinyu Hengdeli Holdings Ltd., in which SG took a strategic stake 
of 6% of the capital in 2005, raised to 8% in 2007 and 9% in 2009.71 In addition, since 2006, 
one of the eight members of the Board of Directors, Shi Zhongyang, has been a legal counsel 
for SG, whose employ he entered in 2000.72 This enables SG to access some internal 
information and to actively participate in the management of the firm, which is not the case 
with the rival luxury group LVMH, which also holds an interest in Hengdeli (7% in 2009). At 
its origin, Beijing Hengdeli Timepieces Shop was a State-owned enterprise founded in 1957 
and active in the distribution and the sale of watches and clocks in China. Privatized in the 
late 1990s, it was acquired in 1997 by the Zhang family, who had been involved in the watch 
business in continental China and in Hong Kong since the early 1980s.73  
The distribution network of this former State-owned enterprise, combined with the marketing 
know-how of the Zhang family, made Hengdeli Group, listed on the Hong Kong Stock 
Exchange, the leading watch distributor in China. It sells not only SG and LVMH products, 
but also a wide range of Swiss and other brands. It also holds several Swiss brands (Nivada, 
Olma and Numa Jeannin). It has become a force to be reckoned with when it comes to 
organizing the expansion of sales on the Chinese market. 
 
Tab. 3: Hendgeli Group, 2004-2009 
 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 
Gross sales, total 1518 1396 2405 4578 5516 5899 
Retail business 530 637 1363 3048 3742 4435 
Wholesale business 974 745 1025 1439 1631 1329 
Other 14 15 17 90 143 135 
Retail as a % 34.9  45.6  56.7  66.6  67.8  75.2  
Wholesale as a % 64.2  53.4  42.6  31.4  29.6  22.5  
Other as a % 0.9  1.1  0.7  2.0  2.6  2.3  
Source: Annual reports 
 
In the second half of the 2000s, the Hengdeli Group grew at a fast clip, thanks to its 
                                                 
71
 According to the SG annual report. 
72
 www.hengdeliholdings.com, site accessed 16 June 2010. 
73
 Report of Guoco Capital Ltd., www.guococapital.com (site accessed 20 January 2011). 
28 
 
involvement in retailing and the geographical extension of its sales network. The fact that its 
gross sales shot up from 1.5 billion RMB in 2004 to 5.9 billion in 2009 was indeed due to the 
strengthening of retailing activities, which accounted for 34.9% of gross sales in 2004 and 
75.2% in 2009. In particular, it has the biggest luxury watch chain store in China, and has 
extended its network by acquiring other companies. Consequently, the number of its own 
stores soared from 65 in 2005 to 270 in 2010. It also works with more than 300 wholesalers 
throughout China,74 and in 2005 entered into a strategic alliance with three companies with 
powerful distribution networks (Shanghai San Lian Group Ltd; Shanghai Oriental 
Commercial Building Ltd; Shenzhen Hengjili World Branch Watches Center Tdd.). Together, 
they reportedly control some 48% of the Chinese market.75 Moreover, Hengdeli extended its 
geographical network. In 2005, nearly half of retail sales were limited to Beijing (18.5%), 
Zhejiang (18.3%) and Shanghai (10.3%). 76  The following year, the company began 
expanding outside continental China, with for example the acquisition of Elegant 
International Holdings Ltd., which had four boutiques in Hong Kong. By 2009, continental 
China amounted to only 61.6% of gross sales. 
Accordingly, the cooperation with Hengdeli appears to have been one of the pillars of SG’s 
expansion strategy in China since 2005. Hengdeli’s involvement in retailing led notably to the 
creation of flagship boutiques for various Swiss brands, including those held by SG. In 
particular, it cofounded two major joint ventures, one for the exclusive distribution of Omega 
and Rado watches (2003) and the other for the management of flagship boutiques – especially 
Omega and Swatch stores (2007). 
The establishment and large-scale development of flagship boutiques is another characteristic 
of the expansion on the Chinese market (see table 4). The fact that China was a virgin market 
obviously explains the weight of this strategy, as there was no need to negotiate with former 
distributors and independent retailers, on the one hand, and because nobody controlled the 
watch business at the national scale yet, on the other hand. Moreover, the Chinese customer 
had to be “educated” in terms of luxury and watch culture, and flagship boutiques played a 
very important role in this respect. In 2010, there were a great many flagship boutiques in 
China, especially for Omega, which had 84 of its 178 boutiques in China (47.2%) and Swatch, 
which had 66 (more than 10%). The Longines and Blancpain boutiques are also strongly 
represented on this market. This marked presence in China peaked in May 2010, with the 
opening of Swatch Art Peace Hotel, in Shanghai. 
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Tab. 4: SG’s flagship boutiques, July 2010 
Source: Internet website of each brand (sites accessed 7 July 2010). 
Note: n.c. = not communicated 
 
4.6 Financial impact of the new marketing strategy 
Whereas the restructuring of 1985-1995 not only made the company more profitable but 
weaned it off outside capital, which were the consequences of the new marketing strategy in 
terms of finance and governance? 
The tremendous growth in gross sales, which skyrocketed from CHF 2.6 billion in 1995 to 4.5 
billion in 2005 and to 6.5 billion in 2010, was accompanied by fast-growing profits. Indeed, 
net profit after taxes and depreciation came to CHF 273 million in 1995 and to 763 million in 
2009, after having peaked at 1 billion in 2007. Measured as a relative number, profits 
averaged 11.2% of gross sales in 1995-1999, 13.3% in 2000-2004 and 16.4% in 2005-2009. 
Thus, SG’s repositioning into luxury had a direct positive effect on gross sales growth and 
profit margins. Profits were generously distributed: the dividend rate shot up from 17% in 
1995 to 55% in 2000 and 178% in 2008. Yet reserves also grew steadily, reaching CHF 2.0 
billion in 1995 and 5.9 billion in 2009. Shareholders’ equity remained stable, at an average of 
72.0% in 1995-2009, that is, the level reached in 1995. 
The company’s development and growing profitability also had an essential impact on 
governance, whose main feature was the affirmation of Hayek family. When the bankers 
resigned from the Board of Directors, most of them were not remplaced by new appointees, 
and the number of Board members fell from 9 persons in 1990 to 6 in 1998. Three new 
members, all appointed in 1995, were Nayla Hayek, daughter of the president, Professor 
Klaus Schwab, director of the World Economic Forum, and Ernst Tanner, president of the 
Brand Total China 
(Hong Kong included) 
As a % 
Breguet 19 1 5.3 
Blancpain 21 5 23.8 
Glashütte Original (Watch Atelier) 5 3 60.0 
Swatch > 600 66  10-11% 
Omega 178 84 47.2 
Longines 20 11 55.0 
Jaquet-Droz 6 2 33.3 
Tissot 79 n.c. ? 
Boutiques Tourbillon 17 2 11.8 
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chocolate company Lindt & Sprüngli SA and a member of the Board of Directors of the 
Credit Suisse Group. The next appointees (Johan-Niklaus Schneider-Ammann in 1999; 
Claude Nicollier in 2005; Jean-Pierre Roth in 2010) also had only very limited influence on 
corporate management. The appointment of Nicollier, who is not a shareholder, could even be 
interpreted as a marketing ploy: posing with his astronaut suit in annual reports and on the 
company’s website, he recalls Omega’s involvement in the Apollo space program and the trip 
to the Moon, thereby helping to strengthen the brand’s technical and historical legitimacy. 
By allowing him to move away from bankers, the financial empowerment strategy enabled 
Nicolas Hayek and his family members to reinforce their grip, thanks to the constant 
enlargement of their shares. Indeed, the percentage of voting rights he personally controlled 
with his shares rose from 28.5% in 1998 to 36.4% in 2005 and to 40.2% in 2009. Moreover, 
he actively prepared the arrival of the second generation in the business. Thus, his daughter 
Nayla was appointed to the Board of Directors in 1995, whereas his son Georges Nicolas, 
known as Nick, employed in the marketing department of Swatch SA, an SG company in 
charge of marketing Swatch watches, became a member of the enlarged direction (1994) and 
then of the direction (1995) of the group, and was appointed CEO of Swatch SA shortly 
thereafter (1998). In 2003, Nicolas G. Hayek retired from his position of CEO of SG, which 
he passed on to his son Nick, but remained active as President of the Board of Directors. In 
addition, his grandson Mark A. Hayek was appointed Marketing Manager (2001), then CEO 
of Blancpain SA (2002), a dazzling promotion which is obviously not unrelated to Biver’s 
departure from SG (2003). Mark A. Hayek was also appointed to the enlarged direction 
(2002), then to the direction (2005) of the group. As a result, when Nicolas G. Hayek passed 
away suddenly in 2010, there was no break in corporate governance and management: Nayla 
became President of the Board of Directors and Nick remained CEO, while Mark has tended 
to strengthen his involvement in exclusive luxury brands. 
 
Conclusion 
In the space of some fifteen years, between 1985 and 2000, SG experienced a sea change 
which made it shift from a very disparate conglomerate of weakly integrated Swiss watch 
companies to a centralized, rationalized and globalized company. Whereas its Japanese rival – 
Seiko, Citizen, Casio – rushed headlong in the 1990s and 2000s into technological innovation 
as a possible driving force to enter a new growth phase, SG managed to establish itself as the 
world’s leading watch company without showing technological innovation. This 
“non-technological innovation”, as Jeannerat and Crevoisier called it, is basically rooted in 
two complementary policies: the rationalization of production system, and the implementation 
of a new marketing strategy. 
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The first phase of the rationalization of production systems lasted from SG’s foundation in 
1983 until the end of the 1990s. Its main features were the centralization of movement and 
parts production within the company Eta SA, the vertical integration of parts producers and, 
above all, the globalization of production system with the opening of subsidiaries in Asia 
(Thailand, Malaysia, China). The rationalization boosted productivity and strengthened ETA’s 
historical function of a producer and distributor of movements for the entire Swiss watch 
industry. 
Together with the finalization of this production rationalization process, a new marketing 
strategy was adopted during the first half of the 1990s, following the takeover of Blancpain 
(1992). Characterized by a deep repositioning of brands, this strategy aimed at making SG a 
producer, and above all a trader, of complete watches. Its major features were the acquisition 
of several exclusive luxury brands in 1999-2000 (Breguet, Glashütter Original, Hatot, Jaquet- 
Droz) and the choice of Omega as the main brand to conquer the global market of accessible 
luxury, traditionally a very profitable segment, and to compete with Rolex. This new 
marketing strategy had a key influence on SG’s entire organizational structure. Corporate 
governance tended towards strong concentration and centralization of power. Since 1990, the 
Extended Management Board has functioned as a marketing platform for coordinating the 
group’s global strategy between brands. Incidentally, it is interesting to underline here the 
strengthening of the firm’s family nature, with the growing involvement of the Hayek family 
on the operational side of business since 2000. In becoming a global leader, SG became a 
family firm. 
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